Have you noticed how paranoid people are getting about market “volatility”.
OMG, cries the DOL, we’re going to fine employers if their 401k plan participants don’t grow their balances as fast as the average plan around the country… thus making the Federal Government a participant in roughly half the 401k plans in every audit time frame.
Employers use investment plans (401ks) as an employee retention benefit… but by what stretch of the imagination are employers responsible for the financial ignorance/naiveté/ laziness/poor judgment of their employees?
Isn’t this just another overreach by regulators who seem focused on making it as hard as possible for private businesses to remain viable? Why not require unbiased investment education instead and create some productive jobs for a change… most adults are willing to accept responsibility for their own mistakes.
Since the dawn of investment time, market value change has been the lifeblood of investing and speculating… a distinction that “Modern Portfolio Theory” (itself a long-con of great imagination) has hypothetically correlated out of existence.
Without market volatility , there would be no chance of profit and no risk of loss. The absurd “Major Prediction Theater” proposes that past correlations and relationships will be repeated in the future, and that risk can be minimized by gaming with the numbers….
The investor need only select the right mix of speculations. But even if the mumbo jumbo is solid, theoretically, market value volatility remains the reality, and some funds, products, methodologies, and hypotheses outperform others… it’s the performance parameters that require adjusting, not the employer’s fiduciary responsibility.
So instead of relying on Wall Street’s most self-serving hypothesis ever, why not embrace the investment god’s gift of market volatility… as many of us have done effectively since investment puberty?
Regulators only appear to be stupid… they know that neither employers nor employees have the inclination to become proficient investors. They know that businesses fear the pox of a compliance audit… making compliance job designations the fastest growing, non-productive, industry in the economy.
And here’s the kind of decision-making the regulatory Gestapo produce:
“Mr. Jones, we’re fining you a gazillion dollars because your retired participants’ 401ks grew only 2% over the last 3 years and the markets were up 15%; clearly you failed in your fiduciary responsibility”.
“But these people are retired, your lordship.”
Their portfolios are producing over 6% in spending money, less insane federal income taxes (light bulb moment: think how a no tax on retirement income rule would benefit everyone), while the best of the best Target Date Funds pay around 2% before taxes .”
“Not my problem sucker, since when did income become the objective of a retirement program”.
I just read an article that listed six features of “great” 401k plans: high company contributions, instant eligibility, immediate vesting, low fees, auto enrollment, high employee contribution rates.
I agree, but something is missing. What about the investments… a black hole of understanding, in spite of all the information available on the internet. Neither participants nor plan sponsors are fluent in what’s inside the program.
Performance numbers don’t produce understanding or develop reasonable expectations. The focus is on market value “performance” … and expense ratios, regardless of their impact on participants.
Just google a few bond or target fund names see how difficult it is to determine the “yield”, i.e., the income you receive in retirement.
The Vanguard Target Retirement Income Fund, for example, yields less than 2% and has a 30% stock market exposure… the same company’s 2015 “target retirement program” is 52% invested in the stock market, now at about the highest prices in the history of mankind?
The income generated by this extremely popular program (the spending money of retirement) is a disgraceful 2% or so. Hey, these numbers are from their website… and proudly?
But it’s not totally their fault…. more income could increase expense ratios or impact “market value” performance numbers… and the DOL is coming.
401k regulatory “wizards” don’t help very much… nowhere in their search and destroy missions is any mention of income received by people when they choose to retire. Instead, they focus on market value performance and costs of the mix of products available.
Barely anyone speaks of “convertibility” of the program into a real live retirement income machine… certainly not the government. In the mind of the Federal Government (an oxymoron?) it seems, a taxable 2% in employee’s pockets (after low expenses) is somehow better than 6% taxable with a higher expense ratio… it’s da law!
The market value of fixed income purpose securities are expected to “perform” in the same manner as common stocks … and they look at me like I’m smoking something funny!
Although 401k plans are not pension plans (even the modern variety of inadequate income development programs), they are looked at as such by nearly everyone…. especially politicians. In my experience with 401k plans in general, only one type of “investment” product has a focus on the income objective that should actually be the main “target” of any retirement program.
If 401ks are perceived by participants (and much more importantly) by the regulators as retirement programs, one would think that advisers would make a concerted effort to find more suitable income producers to put inside them..
Fed Chairman Bernanke has thrown the kitchen sink at the bond markets to keep interest rates down.
He’s shoved the Fed Funds rate down further — and kept it there longer — than any U.S. Fed Chairman of modern times.
He’s printed more money than any central banker since the Weimer Republic.
He’s bought more bonds than anyone in all of recorded history.
And he’s even tried to give the markets an extra bonus this month by promising to continue buying bonds despite the market’s expectations that he was about to taper his bond-buying extravaganza.
In sum, he’s done many times more than any money-printing madman since the founding of the Republic — all with the explicit purpose of pumping up bond prices and hammering down their yields!
So you’d expect that, with all these record-smashing Herculean efforts, he could have beaten bond markets into submission.
Since July 24, 2012 — 14 months and 4 days ago — his entire operation has been misfiring and backfiring.
Bond prices have gone DOWN instead of up.
Long-term interest rates have gone UP instead of down.
And tens of thousands of bond investors around the world have been defying the Fed Chairman like a growing flock of mocking birds.
This isn’t just monetary theory. It’s a fundamental, real-world failure by the Fed to pass a simple smell test.
Nor is it subtle.
Sure, some bond investors breathed a temporary sigh of relief two weeks ago when they learned Bernanke was going to continue his bond buying bonanza for a while longer.
But now, even that relief is fading, as interest rates have turned sharply higher again.
Our advice: Don’t let anyone — the Fed OR the bond markets — make a mockery of your financial future.
Keep most of your money safe. Stash it in short-term instruments that are not vulnerable to falling bond prices. Then, when I give you the signal that rates have reached a peak, be ready to lock in some of the best yields in decades.
I saw a question posted on a popular social network. The question was: ‘What is the difference between gambling and investing?” I’m inspired to reproduce (edited with permission) the following excerpt from A Maverick Investor’s Guidebook (Insomniac Press, 2011) which I believe provides as good an answer as one might find.
How to Tell the Difference Between Investing and Gambling!
“How do you develop ‘smart thinking’ and when do you know you’ve got ‘avarice’?”
My instinctive response would be: “You always know when you’re being greedy. You just want someone else to say that your greed is okay.” Well, I’ll say it then: greed is okay. The proviso is that you fully understand when greed is motivating your decision and live with the consequences. Avarice is driven by desire, which is not a trait of an investor.
Remember, it’s best if investment decisions are rational and stripped of emotion. Greed is associated with elation on the one hand, and anger (usually directed at oneself) on the other hand.
When decisions are motivated by greed, I call it gambling. In my mind, there are different sorts of gamblers. Some gamblers place modest bets, and if they win, they move along to another game. For me this might be roulette. There are those who enjoy playing one game they’re good at, such as blackjack or craps, hoping for a big score. Finally, there are those who are addicts. I can’t help those folks, so let’s assume we’re just discussing the first two types.
It’s okay to do a bit of gambling with a modest part of your disposable income. In fact, investors can apply some of what they know and have fun too. Unlike the casinos, financial markets have no limits or games stacked in favour of the house. It’s the Wild West, and if an investor understands herd behaviour and the merits of contrarian thinking, and does some research, the results can be quite lucrative. Whether using stocks, bonds, options, hedge funds, domestic mutual funds, foreign equity or debt funds, or commodity exchange-traded funds (if you don’t know what these things are and want to know, buy a book that introduces investment theory and the various types of securities), applying investment principles will help you be more successful.
To put it plainly: counting cards may not be allowed in a casino, but anything goes when it comes to markets. Just don’t forget that most of the financial industry is trying to make your money their money. There’s a reason why a cowboy sleeps with his boots on and his gun within reach.
The fine line between gambling and investing is hard even for old cowhands to pinpoint. Investing also involves bets, but the bets are calculated. Every decision an investor makes involves a calculated bet—whether it’s to be in the market or not at all, biasing a portfolio in favour of stocks versus bonds, skewing stock selection in favour of one or several industry groups, or picking individual stocks or other types of securities.
I met a lady once in line at a convenience store. She bought a handful of lottery tickets, and I asked her, “Aren’t the odds of winning pretty remote for those lotteries?” Her reply was, “The odds are good. There’s a fifty/fifty chance of me winning.” Confused, I asked, “How do you figure?” I laughed aloud when she said, “Either I win or I lose; that’s fifty/fifty, isn’t it?”
A maverick investor knows there’s always a probability that any decision to buy or sell or hold can prove to be incorrect. The objective is to minimize that probability as much as is feasible. It’s impossible to make it zero. This is why financial firms have sold so many “guaranteed” funds lately. People love the idea, however impossible, of being allowed to gamble with no chance of losing. Whenever there’s a promise that you won’t lose or some other similar guarantee, my senses fire up a warning flare.
There’s usually a promise of significant upside potential and a guarantee that at worst you’ll get all (or a portion) of your original investment back. Many investors a few years ago bought so-called guaranteed funds only to find that the best they ever did receive was the guaranteed amount (extremely disappointing) or much less after the fees were paid to the company offering the product. If you think this stuff is new, trust me, it’s not.
A fancy formula-based strategy back in the ‘80s called “portfolio insurance” was popular for a brief period. An estimated $60 billion of institutional money was invested in this form of “dynamic hedging.” It isn’t important to know in detail how the math works. Basically, if a particular asset class (stocks, bonds, or short-term securities) goes up, then you could “afford” to take more risk because you are richer on paper anyway, so the program would then buy more of a good thing. If this better-performing asset class suddenly stopped performing, you simply sold it quickly to lock in your profits. The problem was that all these programs wanted to sell stocks on the same day, and when everyone decides they want to sell and there are no buyers, you get a stalemate.
The “insurance” might have worked if you actually could sell the securities just because you wanted to, but if you can’t sell, you suffer along with everyone else—the notional guarantee isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on. Remember these are markets, and even though you see a price in the newspaper or your computer screen for a stock, there’s no trade unless someone will step up to buy stock from you. The market crash that began on Black Monday— October 19, 1987—was, in my opinion, fuelled by portfolio insurance programs. The market was going down, so the programs began selling stocks all at once. There weren’t nearly enough buyers to trade with. By the end of October ’87, stock markets in Hong Kong had fallen 45.5%, and others had fallen as follows: Australia 41.8%, Spain 31%, the U.K. 26.4%, the U.S. 22.7%, and Canada 22.5%.
Minimizing the Probability of Stupidity
If you’re gambling, follow the same steps you would as ifyou were investing. If it’s a particular stock you are anxious to own, do some homework, or at least look at someone else’s research available through your broker or on the Internet. When I was a younger portfolio manager, there were limited means to learn about a company. I would have to call the company and ask for a hardcopy annual report to be sent to me. When it arrived after several days, I’d study it a bit so I didn’t sound too ignorant, then I’d call and try to get an executive (controller, VP finance, or investor relations manager) to talk to me. If asking questions didn’t satisfy my need to know, then I’d ask to come and meet with them in the flesh. Nowadays, you have all the information you need at your fingertips.
Money.ca is a PRIME example of just one such source of valuable information available to investors today!
Back in February of 2012, I recall a prominent CFO departing a global insurance company. This particular individual was labelled “the highly regarded architect of a hedging strategy that proved key in rebuilding investor confidence in the wake of the financial crisis.” The company had suffered financially during the prior market meltdown because of a huge exposure to equity-linked products; pre-crisis the company had introduced investment products that guaranteed to return a substantial (if not all) amount of the investor’s initial investment. The money was invested in the company’s funds which in turn invested in stock markets. During the financial crisis, the value of these assets (stocks) held in the funds declined below the amount that was guaranteed spelling serious trouble for the company. In response a stricter approach to risk management was adopted after-the-fact.
Sounds sensible doesn’t it? But it just isn’t! I’ve watched this pattern time and again over decades. The fundamental flaw is a complete misunderstanding of what constitutes risk.
Risk is almost always equated to volatility. For example, stocks move up and down rapidly with much magnitude so they are deemed more risky than bonds. But are we really as averse to upside risk as downside risk? Strangely people become more averse to volatility when they’ve suffered downside risk (and come to adore volatility when upside risk has rewarded them). Because our internal model of risk is so much more complex than mathematics can reckon with, our efforts to ‘manage’ volatility can actually subject us to less volatility but more risk. When we reduce risk (hedging strategies usually reduce volatility – both up and down) at the wrong times, we miss the chance to be rewarded by the kind of volatility we adore. We are our own worst enemies.
The President and CEO of a completely different insurance company was quoted as saying this, also in February of 2012:
“We are maintaining our equity hedges as we remain very concerned about the economic outlook over the next few years. We continue to be soundly financed with year-end cash and marketable securities at the holding company of about $1 billion.”
This statement followed the company’s earnings release, having reported substantially increased losses from its investments – management had hedged the company’s equity position in 2010 (again, after-the-fact) and suffered investment losses in that year’s fourth-quarter because stock markets rose (instead of declining). The actions designed to protect the company against volatility lost money. Risk aversion after-the-fact caused the company to lose money and avoid potential returns from upside volatility.
Because the pain caused by the downside volatility suffered previously was still fairly recent, aversion remained at a high level causing the company to stick to its hedging strategy (in denial?) despite these huge losses, and it continued to lose money as the market continued to go higher and higher still.
The financial crisis is behind us and now that markets are hitting all-time highs, record amounts of dollars are scrambling to get some upside volatility action. Too late? It’s hard to put a pin in it, but intuitively might one conclude that if managing risk (or ‘risk off’ as they say on business television) was a bad idea during and immediately after the financial crisis, then perhaps chasing volatility (‘risk on’) might not be such a good idea at present?
It might seem as if I was picking on insurance companies earlier, but many pension funds, other financial services companies, portfolio managers and everyday investors follow the same destructive pattern. Adoring upside risk but loathing downside risk – always at the wrong times – has ruined careers and put a serious dent in the life-savings of families. More experienced money managers (there are fewer of us nowadays) increase risk when others are most averse to the idea, and begin to manage risk (hedging, raising cash balances) during periods of ‘irrational exuberance.’ They’ve learned the hard way that it’s easier to keep all the hair on your head if you avoid circumstances that make you want to pull it all out.
You can avoid plenty of grief by reading headlines and as George Costanza (from the popular sitcom Seinfeld) says: “Do the opposite.”
You might notice that the average ‘Joe’ was far more concerned about his job (justifiably) until we began seeing headlines such as ‘Dow Hits Highest Close Ever.’ All of a sudden the stock market is once again a worthy topic for discussion and it’s okay to actually speak to one’s investment advisor. Judging by money flows it’s a good bet that clients are instructing their advisors to buy stocks, EFT’s, equity mutual funds or whatever it takes to get them invested and fast. There’s nothing but good news. As I type this, ‘Stocks resume winning ways’ appears on the TV screen (CNBC).
Before succumbing to the urge to herd let me take you back to June of 2010.
In the first chapter of A Maverick Investor’s Guidebook (Insomniac Press, 2011) I wrote the following:
In one newspaper, under the title “Economic crisis,” I found the headline: “World recovery under threat as growth slows, stimulus wanes.” On the same day in another newspaper, under the title “Recovery angst” was the similarly ominous caption: “Economic trouble is all investors see.”
If you are spooked by such nonsense and inclined to adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ approach before investing any of your money at all in financial markets, then give your head a shake. These headlines are gold!
I went on to pose the question: “If the press is even partially representative of what economists and strategists are recommending, and if investors all share the same sentiments, then what happens when there’s some good news?”
There was plenty of good news even in 2010, but it was generally delegated to those pages in the back of the newspapers which people seldom read. One example, and a very important one for stocks, was rapidly improving corporate profitability.
While the general mood was (and continued to be) let’s say ‘despondent,’ institutional and retail investors kept taking money out of stocks and channeling it into money market funds and bonds – to take advantage of what tiny returns were available in those securities (yes, I am being sarcastic).
Meanwhile in answer to my rhetorical – because it should have been obvious what the answer would be – question in 2010 we certainly know now what happened when there was good news. Stocks skyrocketed and recently surpassed their previous highs.
My concern today is that investors will make the same mistake they always seem to make. Rather than ‘interpreting’ headlines, they will simply take them at face value and chase the stock market at an inopportune time.
I am paraphrasing, but I’ve heard and read nothing but good news of late such as:
“It’s definitely a ‘risk on’ market.”
“Don’t fight the FED!”
“Looks like we might avoid the usual summer slowdown this year.”
Most worrisome: Kramer (wait long enough and you’ll eventually be right) is more wound up than a four-year old high on chocolate. I do believe that stocks are a better investment than bonds over the next several years, but the trend in corporate profitability (and consumer sentiment, GDP and job growth) will be interrupted – count on it – affording convenient opportunities to get invested. With nothing but good news and euphoria, what happens if we get some bad news? A chance to invest at lower price levels. Right now, ‘risk-on’ is exactly what you should expect if you respond to headlines.
Usually the first vehicle of choice for new investors is a mutual fund. In days of yore, which in the investment industry is more than five years ago, investors usually bought equity funds but in more recent times balanced funds have grown more popular and even bond funds have attracted money.
Oftentimes, the first mutual fund experience is a disappointing one. There’s a reason for this. People intuitively want to be associated with success, so their first mutual fund will have these characteristics:
A great track record of top quartile performance over at least three to five years.
Billions of dollars invested in it, so it is “safe.”
Offered by an investment firm with a long and “distinguished” history.
Many years ago, there was much less data readily available and few statistical tools at one’s disposal, but I was curious and decided to examine a group of funds over time to see what their performance looked like. What I discovered is represented in the chart. There were no exceptions; every fund in my sample followed this same pattern.
It doesn’t take a mathematician to interpret a picture. If you invest in the fund when it’s a dog (ranks very poorly compared to other funds), the odds are great that given time it will be a top performer soon enough.
The problem is that most investors will pick a top performer. However, the top performer will soon become a dog, and the investor will be unhappy.
A great track record might actually guarantee poor performance.
When it comes to your money, intuition sucks. You “intuitively” steer towards something that “feels good.”
There is enough publicly available data nowadays to help you find a few funds that suit your tastes and examine their performance patterns. What suits your tastes may include funds that are easy to buy in and out of, those you have read about in the press, whose portfolio manager sounds smart on TV, or you may prefer socially responsible funds. When one of the funds that does occasionally perform very well has been in a slump over the past year or two, buy it. After the performance has improved over the course of a couple of years and you’re happy with the results, consider selling (or redeeming) it when the fund is in the top of the rankings (or wins an award) and buy a different fund that is in a temporary slump.
Being a curious sort, I once had the urge to see if award-winning funds followed the same pattern. After all, if someone wants a top-performing fund, wouldn’t they head straight for the ones that have just won awards for their outstanding performance?
I looked at the award-winning funds in any given year, and then checked their performance just one year later. Rather than examine every category (there are just too many nowadays) I stuck to basic Canadian equity, U.S. equity, small cap, international equity. Included were “thematic” funds popular at the time, such as ‘precious metals’ and the ‘dividend and income’ funds. Here are a couple of examples of what I usually found:
100% of the winners were either 1st or 2nd quartile funds. The next year, 88% of these had fallen to 3rd or 4th quartile.
All the former 3rd quartile funds (dogs) rose to 1st quartile (stars) in the following year.
Winning an award (being a top performer) is not an indication of how that fund will rank in terms of its future performance, even in the following year. In fact, the odds are awfully good that your 1st or 2nd quartile pick will be below the median or worse one year later. Interesting! If there’s a lesson, I suppose it’s simply that funds should be bought because they meet your objectives, not because they’ve been performing well recently.
It’s not important to understand why this roller coaster occurs for mutual funds, it just does. Markets change, so, for example, when a growth fund invested primarily in technology stocks suffers, it’s no doubt because the upward trend in technology stocks, or their popularity among the herd, has either stopped or deteriorated. Apple is a prime example in the news right now.
Portfolio managers are just people working for people. I’ve witnessed the following scenario occur time and again:
Fund performance begins to soar.
Fund attracts lots of new money.
Marketing folks want more and more time from portfolio manager for meetings.
Money pours into the fund in droves.
Portfolio manager’s head swells (the “I’m a genius” syndrome).
Performance begins to deteriorate.
Money leaves the fund in droves.
Portfolio manager has to sell the fund’s best stocks (there are still buyers for these).
Performance sucks, and it takes two to three years for things to get back to normal.
Size really doesn’t matter…unless the fund is humongous.
A thinking person should be able to figure out that it doesn’t take a big fund or a big fund company to provide good performing funds. Think about it. Do you shop at the big box stores because the level of service is better? Is the quality of the merchandise better? No. You shop there because the economy of scale for the store allows them to buy products at a lower cost. They can order in bigger volumes and squeeze their suppliers. They then pass these savings to their customers.
Larger financial institutions enjoy similar economies of scale. Of course, the transactions and administration costs of the bank or insurance company are lower, and these benefits might come your way in the form of lower fees and expenses, but we’re not talking about buying lawnmowers. Rates of return on funds managed nimbly and intelligently can make those fees and expenses pale by comparison.
Bigger is safer possibly when you’re banking, but legitimate capital management companies are structured so that they never really touch your money. The custodial (where the money is physically held) and administrative (recordkeeping) functions are usually provided to these firms by big banks or huge financial institutions anyway—for safety and regulatory reasons and it makes the potential for fraud near impossible.
The reason why large financial services companies got into the fund management business was simply economics. They were providing banking, custodial, and administrative services to mutual fund and other asset management companies anyway, so why not also earn management fees by offering their own mutual funds and private wealth management services?
Take it from someone who knows from experience. Managing a massive quantity of money in one fund is much more difficult for a portfolio manager. You can only buy big companies. A portfolio manager will try to buy the best big companies, but since everyone else with big portfolios is doing the same thing, it’s not like you can outsmart them. It’s sort of like playing poker with jacks, queens, and kings being the only cards in the deck. If the three other players see three kings on the table, everyone knows you still have one in your hand.
Applying some discipline is important when directing your savings and will spare you much grief. For several years since the financial crisis, investors have swarmed into bond (see chart – it shows the net Sales of bond mutual funds) and balanced funds because of their strong relative performance and are considered to be less risky. Even today buying into income-oriented funds ‘feels good’ – everyone else is doing it, past performance is good and the fright we all experienced during the financial crisis still stings a bit.
Equity funds have been avoided for years – constantly redeemed – despite the fact the stock market returns have been outstanding since the crisis more or less ended (or at least stabilized). Now that the past returns are looking better, investors will be shifting money out of the bond funds (and perhaps balanced funds as well) and chasing the top performing equity funds.
This is an inferior strategy. If you examine the best ‘rated’ funds you will find they hold more dividend paying and income securities and will likely drop in the rankings very soon after you buy them.
With RRSP season comes a plethora of marketing campaigns and firms will be pushing us to buy their best performing funds (we are so quick to buy what ‘feels good’). Since you won’t see many advertisements for those not doing so well today, but are likely to do very well tomorrow, it would be wise to do a bit of homework before buying in. Good luck!
I’ve been reading lots of articles suggesting that the stock market is ‘overbought’ (an expression meaning that we’re in some sort of a bubble, stocks are overvalued and risk is high that they’ll plummet) but then I’ve been reading the same thing over and over for a few years. In fact I’ve been hearing the same thing ever since I suggested buying stocks while writing my book (A Maverick Investor’s Guidebook, Insomniac Press) back in 2010. I’ve been a portfolio manager for a very long time, and find it fascinating that investors – even professional money managers – let their judgement be unduly influenced by their opinions which are biased by experience. Experience is a funny thing. For instance, the wife of a good friend of mine went to the trouble of working towards getting her motorcycle license. Although she passed the test with little difficulty, she hopped on her husband’s bike to go for a ride, lost control and dropped the bike. She never tried riding a bike ever again because of one bad experience.
Consider this quote from a smart friend of mine:
‘How much has your equity portfolio given on a yearly basis from January 1 , 2007 to today ( 6 years in 3 weeks. By bet is around 2%. You are doing some wishful thinking Mal. The growth game is over.”
Why did she pick that particular date? It’s probably not an accident. Timing is everything when it comes to volatile assets and the stock market is nothing if not volatile. Randomly chat with folks (like I do) and you’ll find some just can’t believe the stock market has made anyone any money…..EVER! Talk to someone else and they might tell you they’ve been very happy with their experience. Have a look at this graph:
If you’d invested your money (starting point) five or six years ago, you’d understandably be disappointed – see the red line. If you’d decided to include stocks in your financial plan ten years ago (green line), it’s likely you’re satisfied and have no difficulty weathering a temporary storm. An investor who read my book and put money to work coming out of the financial crisis (orange) will not only be ecstatic, he/she will no doubt have an exaggerated sense of their own investment ‘skills.’
In my estimation (which could be dead wrong) economic growth has only just begun to accelerate and I am not the only soul that believes it. John Aitkens is an old friend and an excellent investment strategist at TD Securities. These are his words (and his chart):
“We continue to believe that global policy stimulus is driving a re-acceleration of US and global growth that will become increasing evident over the next few months. We therefore continue to recommend an overweight in stocks and an underweight in bonds. We recommend overweighting non-price sensitive cyclical areas (technology, industrials, consumer discretionary), while underweighting defensive sectors (utilities, telecom, consumer staples). We have financials, resources and health care at market weight.”
Over many years John and I have been in agreement about the direction of markets…..i.e. he’s usually right.
There is a plethora of articles and blogs out there desperately trying to find a period comparable to now, in order to get some understanding of what markets might have in store for us over the next several years. After three decades in the investment business, the only thing I can say with certainty is that such comparisons just don’t work.
George Santayana (December 16, 1863 – September 26, 1952) the philosopher and man of letters, is often quoted: “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”
It’s true people will make the same mistakes over and again, but history never actually repeats itself. Trying to forecast the future is absurd, and so it must be even more ridiculous to expect that the future will be similar to some time period long ago. Nevertheless, it’s winter and all my friends are on vacation so I’ve nothing else to do.
Post-War Reconstruction: In my simple mind, we’ve just fought a global war against financial corruption. The weapon of mass destruction? The ‘derivative!’ These things managed to infiltrate the entire global banking system and almost brought it crumbling down. Like most wars, it’s difficult to put a pin into when things flipped from a crisis to all out war, but let’s say the seeds were planted when the U.S. Senate tried to introduce a bill in 2005 to forbid Fannie Mae (the Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) from holding mortgage-backed securities (pretend capital) in their portfolios. That first cannonball missed the mark when the bill failed to pass. By 2007 the two government sponsored entities were responsible for 90% of all U.S. mortgages, and the fly in the ointment was the use of ‘derviatives’ instead of real capital to hedge their interest-rate risk. Banks did the same thing but much more aggressively. What followed is a long story we’ve been living for years.
Paul Volcker once said, “I wish someone would give me one shred of neutral evidence that financial innovation has led to economic growth — one shred of evidence.” Well, we’ve plenty of evidence now that financial innovation led only to the mass destruction of wealth.
When the foundation fell out from under us (value of the derviatives dropped) we went to war in earnest. The list of casualties like Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (announced September 15, 2008 it was bankrupt) just kept getting longer.
I believe the war ended six years after that failed 2005 Senate bill – in the summer of 2011. You can disagree, but your opinion is as meaningless as this whole exercize. (Laughing out loud.)
Way back when World War II (1939 – 1945) ended, governments around the globe began to print money and spend to rebuild the wealth that had been destroyed. Isn’t this precisely what we’ve been doing since our financial crisis decimated wealth on a global scale?
So maybe some of what happened in the 1950’s post-war period will happen again?
In 1949 there was a brief struggle with the threat of deflation (and again in 1954) but for most of the decade inflation remained steady between 0% to 3%. We too saw the threat of deflation briefly in 2009. However since then inflation has been fairly steady: 1.5% (December to December) in 2010 and 3.2% in 2011 in the U.S. Although T-bills are currently paying a negative real rate of return (yields are below the inflation rate) there will come a time soon when investors insist on earning something or they just won’t hold them. Short term rates will climb as they did throughout the 1950’s.
Prediction #1: T-Bills will begin to rise until their returns cover the rate of inflation (see chart).
What happened in the stock market back then? Government spending to rebuild infrastructure and create jobs had a significant impact, because arguably the 1950’s was one of the best if not the best decade for making money in the stock market. Unfortunately, we only have reliable data for the Dow Jones Industrial Average dating back that far (okay, there might be more data out there but I’m surely not going to go looking for it).
At the end of 1949 the Dow was at 200.13 and by the end of 1959 it had climbed to 679.36. Excluding dividends that equates to a (IRR) return of about 13% per year for a decade. As always lots of volatility had to be endured in stocks, but in the long run the reward was not shabby! On the other hand, in Treasury bonds you might have averaged a 2% return, but suffered an actual loss in 5 out of the 10 years.
Prediction #2: Global growth fueled by government initiatives will translate into healthy returns on average in stock markets for several years to come.
Are we doomed to repeat history? Although the 1950’s turned out okay, a wild ride was to come during the following couple of decades. Easy money and inflation would eventually get the better of us and although there were some very good years for investors in the stock market (and those invested in shorter term T-bills for sure), inflation mayhem was on its way.
All we can hope for is that today’s policy makers have studied their history. If we allow inflation to get out of control, interest rates will skyrocket like they did through the 60’s and 70’s. Younger folks today will have to suffer rising interest rates (mortgages, car loans) of the sort that created havoc for decision-makers and choked economic growth to a standstill for us older generations back in the day.
It’s true that if we don’t learn from history, we can and will make the same mistakes over again. But I also said history does not repeat itself. Although we somehow managed to eventually wrestle the inflation bogieman under control before, this does not mean we will be so lucky next time around. And it’s a wealthier more technologically advanced world we live in now….which means we’ve so much more to lose if we really screw things up.
Prediction #3: If governments don’t slow down their spending, bond investors will really get burned.
My instincts tell me that 2013 will be a happy New Year. And bear in mind that if none, any or all of these predictions come true it will be an unadulterated fluke.